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Bodies on Trial:
Performances and Politics in Medicine and Biology
Introduction
Marc Berg and Madeleine Akrich
Body & Society, 10, pp.1-12.
This special issue, devoted to the question of the body in medicine and biology, brings
together a group of authors whose roots lie within the field of science and technology
studies (STS), and at the intersections of STS with medical sociology and medical
anthropology. As testified by the vitality of Body & Society, ‘the body’ is in the center of
revived attention in the social sciences and humanities. Medical sociology and anthropology
has produced important contributions to the renewal of the body’s conceptualisation1, and
feminist studies have put the construction of ‘sex’ and its relationships to gender center
stage.2 Some authors even argue that social theory should be re-centered around the notion
of ‘embodiment’ or a similar concept.3 What kind of insights can STS studies bring into
this set of interrogations? Briefly said, STS approaches may help escape the pull between
two powerful theoretical/philosophical positions that have, for some time, been at work in
conceptualizing the body: phenomenological approaches on one side, and constructivist
approaches on the other.
The field of STS gained momentum in the 1980s by turning empirical research
methods on the production of scientific facts. Taking an ‘agnostic’ stance, ethnographers
entered laboratories and started to investigate ‘science in the making’. Directly questioning
traditional philosophical viewpoints on the epistemological uniqueness of ‘doing science’,
these researchers argued that the attribution of this unique epistemological quality was a
thoroughly social process.4
This reinterpretation of the nature of scientific development subsequently led to
increased attention to the social nature of technological development, the place of scientific
expertise in policy making, science policy, medical sociology, and so forth. Among these
lines of investigation, one strong strand has most potential to contribute to discussions on
the ‘body’: those approaches that have focused on the materiality of technoscientific
practice. Starting with a deep interest in the ways experiments and technological
2development are social practices yet cannot be simply reduced to social interactions, many
authors have started to investigate the very nature of ‘matter’, ‘objects’ and ‘embodiment’.5
Centralizing 'embodiment' without presupposing an a-historical, biologically
grounded 'body' is, of course, already a familiar challenge in studies of the body.6 Yet
starting from its interest in technoscientific objects, STS has emphasized the central role of
‘objects’ and ‘materiality’ in any viable social theory. It has emphasized the material
heterogeneity of the networks that constitute society, and has stressed the active, mediating
role of objects and artefacts in shaping categories previously deemed to be ‘purely social’:
human interactions, organizations, professions, expertise, and so forth.7  STS’s emphasis
on the material heterogeneity of practices and its struggle with the concurent historicity and
durability of ‘objects’ and ‘matter’, when applied to the body8, provides the analyst with
theoretical tools allowing to meet the challenge drawn by Donna Harraway: to acknowledge
the body’s active status as agent without implying its immediate, pre-fixed presence, in other
words considering it as a ‘material-semiotic generative node’ which is fundamentally both
discursive and material, both historical and real (Haraway 1991, 197-201).9
A second distinctive feature of STS, its agnosticism, gives it a potent recourse when
confronted with the body question: STS does not need, and even actively refuses, to make
any hypothesis about the nature of the objects it studies. On the contrary, it considers this
'nature' an empirical question. In this perspective, the analysis does not privilege any ‘kind’
of body over the others, the body as represented in scientific discourse, the body as
experienced by the patient, the body as locus of medical practices, the body as inscribed in
medical records, etc. Instead it tries to trace the intricacy of all these bodies, describing how
each ‘body ‘is specifically connected to a set of practices, material devices and rhetorical
genres, which include modalities defining the way it relates to other ‘bodies’.10
In this special issue, thus, we are first of all committed to bracketing out pre-fixed
notions of what a body might be, and how it might be delineated. As just pointed out, these
notions should not be seen as the starting point of a theoretical analysis, but as the empirical
result of practices, as the effect of the development of specific networks (Callon and Law
1995). What we attempt to do here, then, might be summarized as investigating whether a
reconfigured notion of ‘embodiment’ might serve as a fruitful bridge between the historical
specificity of bodies and the lived, ‘first person’ experience of having/being a body.
Embodiment, so we would claim, can be seen as a process rather than as a pre-given
biological fact; it can be empirically studied as the outcome of historical processes rather
than posited as the elementary starting point for social theorizing. Redefined in this way,
embodiment points both at the process of the emergence of a specific (concept of the) body,
3and at the real-time having/being of this body. This process can be conceptualized as a
series of trials, as emergences of specific characteristics in and through the confrontation
with features of the network of which the emerging body is a part.
To unravel the multitude of issues that are at stake in such an approach, this special
issue is divided into three parts. The first part, Performing Bodies, focuses on the
production and performance of bodies within medical and biological practices. The three
articles elaborate a performative notion of ‘bodies’ and ‘embodiment’. This implies the
already mentioned notion that ‘the body’ and ‘body boundaries’ are not taken as self-
evident, a-historical concepts, but that they are seen as historically constructed. It makes no
sense to try to debate the essential nature of the body, or, for that matter, to implicitly posit a
pre-existing ‘wholeness’ of the body which is subsequently undone and reduced through
for example ‘medical technology’ (cf. Berg and Mol 1998, Komesaroff (1995)). The
ontology of bodies is exactly what is taken to be an empirical matter – the outcome of the
trials. In their study, for example, Marc Berg and Paul Harterink argue that Foucault’s
modern, medical body might have been a reality in research practices at the beginning of this
century, but that it certainly did not figure in the everyday medical wards and offices of that
time. The emergence of this body in clinical practice, they argue, was closely tied to the
emergence of a technology that stands central in its performance: the patient centered
medical record. Berg and Harterink argue that this body is the effect of a historical
development, and that it is in fact a modest medical technology such as the medical record
that has helped create it.
This construction of bodies and body boundaries, moreover, is not something that
has been done and is now achieved. The notions of ‘performance’ and ‘embodiment’ can
be seen to point at the ongoing nature of the process: these are entities that have to be
continually performed and maintained for them to persist. Bodies, Annemarie Mol and John
Law argue in their article on the performance of hypoglycaemia, are enacted. Their specific
reality stands or falls with the active presence of devices, routines, modes of self-monitoring,
and so forth. ‘Bodies’ are not interpreted, not pre-existing, not merely the concrete
instantiation of ‘larger’ historical developments, but performed, in concrete practices and in
highly specific ways.
In addition, bodies and body-boundaries are seen to be variable entities which can
and are performed differently in different cultures, different practices, and sometimes even
within one practice. Law and Mol, for one, stress that bodies as such hardly seem to come
into play when one studies the performance of hypoglycaemia. They encounter blood
samples, sugar levels and accounts of life styles – but these do not unequivocally sum up to
4any one ‘body’. The ‘body as a whole’, like the unified Self and the very existence of a
‘first person’ perspective are not only achievements rather than a priori givens – they are
only rare occurences. In a similar mode, Madeleine Akrich and Bernike Pasveer analyze
women’s narratives on the experience of giving birth. Drawing upon a situation in which the
body is often considered as a ‘naturally’ acting entity, they display the long series of
mediations, including technologies, that perform this acting body for the woman herself.
Instead of invariable body/self divides, they argue, narratives constitute varying dichotomies
between a body and an embodied self, none of which is stable. Both Mol and Law and
Akrich and Pasveer, then, stress that we cannot speak of ‘the’ body. We face, rather, a
multiplicity of partial instantiations of bodies, whose interconnections are always tentative
and never self-evident.
Finally, all the authors in this part share the notion that this performance is achieved
by associations of heterogeneous entities. The notion of performance does not imply that
someone or something is ‘doing’ the performance (cf. Butler 1993). Hypoglycaemia or
childbirth is not ‘performed’ by individuals – as actors ‘performing’ roles -, nor is it
‘produced’ in ‘discourse’ (as a text ‘speaking’ its subjects). It is not a social construction,
nor a text; things, practices, architectures play a core role in its construction (as is
exemplified by Berg and Harterink’s emphasis on the patient centered medical record). The
body is ‘done’ by the practice of blood sugar measurement, for one, and by the midwife, the
instruments in the delivery room, the partner, and so forth. Only in the interrelation of these
entities does a specific body arise.11 This implies that performance cannot be described as
re-presentation in a formal sense: that is to say, ‘performance’, for the authors gathered
here, is not the collective production and reproduction of pre-defined categories and social
roles.
In the second part, Body as Mediator, the performance of specific bodies is no
longer the primary point of attention. In this part, authors focus on how bodies are
implicated in the production of biological knowledge (Despret), in the treatment of drug
addicts (Gomart), and in the practices of organ procurement in ‘living cadavers’ (Lock).
Bodies, here, are by-product and mediator: they are one of the elements that come to play in
the performances at stake, yet they can only be in that position because they are themselves
affected by this performance.
Some social scientists have criticized western medical practices as drawing upon and
performing a dualist definition - body/mind - of the person. The different contributions
presented in this part show that this dualist definition is not a permanent one, and that the
patient is himself or herself active in producing if not this dualism than at least a whole array
5of modes of body presences reaching from objectivation to subjectivity. Moreover, the
positioning of the body in relations of knowledge production or treatment often takes
unexpected forms, challenging traditional notions of ‘passive’ subjects ‘undergoing’
treatment and being ‘objectivied’ in order to be medically ‘known’.
In her study of methadone substitution treatment, Emilie Gomart touches upon these
issues. She focuses on the intricate relations between drugs and human agency. In her case,
the point is exactly that under certain conditions the use of drugs such as methadone do not
‘reduce’ users to ‘addicted bodies’. She problematizes received oppositions of free will
versus determination (by drugs or therapists); of agency versus material constraints; of self-
control versus control by drugs. The question of drug use does not revolve around the
determination of bodies (or minds, for that matter) by pharmacological substances. Gomart
argues that her topic necessitates a new vocabulary to describe modes of human agency
because the usual sociological terms of determinism, control, influence, manipulation (by
substance or therapist or user) are not sufficient. These terms can only describe drug or
methadone use as a limitation to true subject-hood, while ‘subjects’, in Gomart’s analysis,
can only exist in and through their constant ‘submission’ to the entities that surround and
perform them.
Related to these issues is the question what this repositioning of the body implies
for the way we conceptualize and evaluate the knowledge that results from these
interactions. If the body is neither a traditional ‘object’ or ‘subject’ of knowledge practices,
but figures as an active mediator upon which these practices draw, what is then the
epistemological consequence of this? Vincianne Despret’s article tackles this complex
question head on. Her paper discusses animal experiments, and discusses the question how
scientific knowledge of animal behavior is possible, and what type of relationships specific
knowledge practices forge between the experimenter, the animal, and the knowledge
produced. It topicalizes the different ways the experimenter and the animal can be embodied
in experiments – and Despret passionately argues for an epistemology in which a care for
the bodies studied, and a relation of mutual ‘affectuation’ between experimenter and object,
produces knowledge that can take us by surprise. In her paper, then, it is again ‘bodies’ that
are at stake – but here as the objects and subjects of knowledge. Good scientific knowledge
about ‘bodies’, she argues, is based upon experiments that maximize the chances of the
object of study to transform the expected results - and ultimately, mediate the experimenter
him- or herself.
Both Despret and Gomart obviously encounter bodies as one of their core mediating
actants – yet their point is that the very concept of the ‘body’ (what it is, how it acts) is itself
6at stake in the practices they study. A ‘final’ theory of the body could never be their entry
point, since it is just one of the phenomena produced in the trials of addiction treatment and
the experiments of animal behavior research. Drawing on a different theoretical framework,
Lock’s study of ‘living cadavers’ is a similar case in point. Lock focuses on the practices of
organ procurement (for transplantation purposes) in brain dead subjects, and elucidates the
striking differences between the way ‘brain dead bodies’ are handled and conceptualized in
the United States and in Japan. In the former case (and in many European countries), the
‘commodification’ of body parts is well advanced, and it is widely accepted that a brain
dead person is ‘dead’ for all legal, ethical and social purposes. In Japan, however, these
‘warm bodies’, with regular heat beats and many intact reflexes are not unequivocally
considered ‘dead’ at all, and the procurement of organs from such bodies is rare and highly
contested. Lock elucidates the subtleties of these differences through interviews with ICU
physicians and nurses, amongst others, and explains these differences through an
elaboration of specific historical developments, differences in legal considerations, religious
backgrounds, the role of the media and so forth. Lock does not focus explicitly on the
materially heterogeneous performance of bodies: her analysis articulates the culturally
different practices around ‘living cadavers’ and is similarly not explicitly concerned with the
mediating role that these cadavers themselves play in these very practices. Yet these
concerns are not far from the surface: the ‘brain dead’ condition can only persist with
‘healthy’ organs through medical interventions, and the peculiar condition of these
‘cadavers’ does play a core role in the way these different cultures enroll them within the
charged debates around organ procurement.
The third and last part, Body Collective, elaborates an issue that has been more or
less present in the papers of this volume: the political nature of the performance of specific
bodies. Often, the politics at stake in topicalizing ‘bodies’ is a struggle for the wholeness of
bodies, or for the integrity of body-boundaries. In such cases, the body’s wholeness and
unity is taken as a primary characteristic, and its materiality is taken as a possible
‘grounding’ for resistance and critique. So ‘invasion’ of female bodies by reproductive
technologies that perform the fetus as ‘subject’ can be criticized by pointing at the female
bodies that are thereby reduced or intervened upon. Likewise, patients’ dependence on
medical drugs and technologies can be described as the gradual ‘emptying out’ of the lived
body by Technology, and as the unfortunate ‘medicalization’ of previously ‘whole’ lives.
This recourse to the integrity and wholeness of bodies has been a powerful and succesful
political strategy for feminists and ethicists, amongst others, in claiming e.g. basic
reproductive rights and, more generally, the right of the individual to decide about any
intervention that deliberately affects his/her body.
7At the same time, however, this position is more and more contested. The authors
joined in this special issue underwrite critiques of authors such as Haraway that the political
grounding that this supposed ‘wholeness’ and ‘integrity’ yields is rather problematic
(1991). For one, it reinvents the body as a universal, a-historical category - and such
categories have never been very generous towards women or people of colour, to name a
few. In addition, the constructivist, performative position elaborated here makes any
recourse to such a pre-existing entity impossible. If every ‘wholeness’ is a historically
specific and performed ‘wholeness’, the question becomes which more or less ‘whole’
body is preferred, and by whom? Different practices within medicine and biology perform
different bodies, and these differences may be a much more important point of entry for
political struggle than the worn critique of the impoverished ‘medical’ body vis-à-vis the
‘lived’ body that would somehow be more pure (ibid.; Mol, 2002).
In her contribution, Irma Van der Ploeg deconstructs in great detail all the operations
that allow for the constitution of new ‘body collectives’ (‘couple’ and ‘fetus’), in fertily
treatments and fetal surgery. She shows how these medical practices and their
accompanying discursive mechanisms render the treatment of male or fetal problems
through interventions on women’s bodies acceptable or even inevitable. But her main point
is political as well as methodological. To develop a critical analysis of technologies and
practices, to be able to fruitfully ask the question of patient autonomy and bodily integrity,
one has to suspend the definition of what counts as individuality, which can no longer be
equated with the boundaries of the individual body, and to describe variations of what it
includes.
A related yet subtly different interpretation of the body politics and the ‘body
collective’ is given by Steve Epstein’s work. Epstein focuses on the debates about the US
1993 NIH Revitalization Act, and especially about those paragraphs that require that women
and members of racial and ethnic minority groups are “included as subjects” in each
clinical study funded by the US National Institutes of Health. These debates, Epstein
convicingly argues, are all about when bodies can be counted as ‘the same’ or have to be
seen as ‘different’, and about what ‘differences’ should be seen to be relevant enough to
count as biologically grounded, distinctive ‘categories’ of bodies. These debates are highly
politically charged, since they are simultaneously about whether collective identities are and
should be underpinned by biological differences - and about which differences matter and
which not. As in van der Ploeg’s article, then, Epstein argues that what counts as the
biological body is a thoroughly political question, drawing novel lines around and between
individuals that separate and join them in novel, ever contested ways.
8In the final article, Bruno Latour draws together several of the themes brought up
throughout the special issue in a novel interpretation of the question what counts as ‘good
science’ in general, and about ‘bodies’ in particular. Bodies, he argues, come into being
through being affected by other bodies, instruments, experiences: the more profoundly the
body has been articulated with all these surrounding entities, the richer, the more collective -
and therefore more ‘real’ - it is. What, however, is a ‘good’ articulation? When the
‘natural’ body is lost to us as a starting point, how do we distinguish ‘good’ ways of
performing bodies from ‘bad’ ways? Drawing upon the work of Isabelle Stengers (e.g.
1997) and Despret (this volume), and following a strategy similar to authors such as
Haraway (e.g. 1989), Latour takes an epistemological approach to this question. Picking up
a trope that has been somewhat neglected in STS since the the demise of the prescriptive
philosophy of science (with Popper and Lakatos being the last ‘heroes’), he pleads for a
novel ‘shibboleth’ to distinguish ‘good’ science from ‘bad’. As science itself, he argues,
this falsification principle cannot avoid being simultaneously political and about ‘truth’: any
epistemology is necessarily a political epistemology. To return to the question of ‘bodies’,
any judgment about what counts as a ‘scientific’ mode of talking about ‘bodies’ is
simultaneously a judgment about what types of bodies should populate our worlds, and how
feasible it is to construct alternative articulations, to perform bodies differently. Addressing
this question in the light of the ever increasing importance of ‘bio-politics’, the definition,
modification and commodification of ‘life’ in all its forms, his article forms a fitting open
end to this special issue.
This special issue, Bodies on Trial, then, first of all puts our understanding of
‘bodies’ to trial. What can we do, theoretically and politically, with this category? How do
the modifications that the authors combined here propose matter to this question? How is
the ‘body’ affected by its confrontation with STS? In its turn, of course, STS is put to trial
as well: will the rephrasings it offers to the social study of the bodies proof to be viable?
Most importantly, however, Bodies on Trial presents the body as being shaped, brought into
being, transformed and known through interactions with other entities (multiple substances
and interventions in the case of diabetes, resuscitation technologies, methadone, multiplicity
of representations in patient records, birth technologies, odor kits and so forth). The ‘lived
body’ is not reduced by its encounters with things and technologies - rather, these
encounters are what brings it to its specific life. Such trials are what performs bodies; such
trials embody us.
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